June Marlene Thomas v. Harry Edward Thomas : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
June Marlene Thomas v. Harry Edward Thomas :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jay D. Edmonds; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Thomas v. Thomas, No. 14503.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/354
rr ---
r - v r 
f 
<'\9 
*c^ 9 
DOCKET NO; 
"
H
 ^ ' P E E M c COURT 
i.WE£ 
/€ ^ 
VO 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 14503 
JUNE MARLENE THOMAS, Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
HARRY EDWARD THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
[ENTC)] APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, JUDGE 
JAY D. EDMONDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, Suite #309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-6686 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: 486-9636 4 
F I L E D 
APR 2 2 19// 
— - - . - - - - - - — - - — — . - • • » 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION CONSTITUTES A SUFFI-
CIENT FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THE CONTEMPT 
CITATION 2 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ABILITY 
TO DELIVER THE STOCK IS RES JUDICATA 3 
POINT III 
IF THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONTEMPT 
CITATION, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS 3 
CASES CITED 
Ellinwood v. Bennion, GC Utah 563, 276 P. 159 3 
Lukich v. Utah Const. Co., 46 Utah 317,150 P. 298 2 
Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519 (1963) 2 
Rohison v. Fillmore Commercial Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790 .... 2 
RULES CITED 
Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3,4 
CONCLUSION 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant herein appeals from a finding of and 
sentence for contempt for his failure to comply with an original decree 
of divorce and with subsequent orders made and entered in this case 
in the District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Appellant was found in contempt for his failure to 
comply with a provision of the Decree of Divorce and with subsequent 
orders ordering him to deliver ten (10) shares of stock of Ute Distribu-
tion Corporation to Plaintiff-Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision and sentence 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By virtue of a Decree of Divorce entered on April 23, 1970, 
Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded, inter alia, ten shares of stock in Ute 
Distribution Corporation (R. 27). She thereafter brought Defendant-
Appellant before the District Court on orders to show cause dated 
February 25, 1974 and December 10, 1975 (R. 46, 88), alleging that 
Defendant-Respondent had failed to deliver the shares of stock to her 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. The first of these orders to show 
cause was heard on June 26, 1974, and resulted in an Order dated 
January 3, 1975 which ordered Defendant-Appellant to deliver the 
10 shares of stock as specified in the decree (R. 70). The second Order 
to Show Cause was heard on January 23 and January 30, 1976 and 
resulted in the finding of contempt (R. 100) from which Defendant-
Respondent here appeals. 
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ARUGMENT 
POINT I 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION CONSTITUTES A 
SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THE CON-
TEMPT CITATION. 
The District Court below prepared, signed and filed a carefully 
considered memorandum decision on February 9, 1976 (R. 94), and 
therein made a specific finding of contempt on the part of Defendant-
Appellant for his failure to comply with a previous order of the Court. 
In this memorandum decision, Judge Croft states: 
". . . it is apparent that he has not complied with Judge Leary's 
order of January 3, 1975 " (R. 100) 
This specific finding, reduced to writing, signed and filed, it is a suffi-
cient basis for the citation of Defendant-Appellant for contempt. None 
of the cases cited by Appellant is factually similar to the case at hand; 
indeed, it is clear that in the principal case upon which he relies, this 
Court dealt with an inconsistency between a written Judgment and 
statements made by a District Judge. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 
118, 378 P.2d 519 (1963). No such problem exists in this case. Further, 
this Court is not called upon here to rule upon the validity of a minute 
entry to support a finding of contempt, as it was in the other principal 
cases cited by Defendant-Appellant . Robison v. Fillmore Commercial 
Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790; Lukich v. Utah Const. Co., 46 Utah 317, 
150 P. 298. It is submitted that Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision 
fulfills the requirements which this Court expressed in Powers v. 
Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d ;519 (1963): 
". . . in order to justify a finding and sentence for contempt the 
proof should be clear and satisfactory that the contemptor was 
in violation or defiance of the court's order. When this is done 
it is necessary for the court to make written findings upon 
the specific conduct found to be contemptuous. . . ." (emphasis 
added) 
It is perfectly clear from the record before this Court that Judge Croft 
based his finding of contempt on specific conduct of the Defendant-
Appellant, viz., that he failed to comply with the Court's order of 
January 3, 1975 (R. 100). 
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POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ABILITY 
TO DELIVER THE STOCK IS RES JUDICATA. 
The Decree of Divorce which awarded the stock in question to 
Plaintiff-Respondent was properly supported by findings and conclu-
sions. From the record, it is clear that during the course of their 
marriage, the parties acquired 23 shares of the stock (R. 30). There is, 
in addition, a specific finding that the parties, at the time of trial, 
stipulated to the award of ten shares of this stock to Plaintiff-
Respondent (R. 31). No attempt was ever made by Defendant-Appellant 
to strike, modify or appeal from these two specific findings. Accord-
ingly, his ability to deliver the stock in question, if indeed it must 
necessarily be established, is in fact established by the record itself 
and this determination is res judicata here. 
POINT III 
IF THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE DIS-
TRICT COURT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONTEMPT CITATION, THE CASE SHOULD BE RE-
MANDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING FIND-
INGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
It is submitted that if this Court deems Judge Croft's Memor-
andum Decision to be insufficient to support the contempt citation, 
the case should merely be remanded to the District Court with instruc-
tions that specific findings and conclusions be made and entered. 
Indeed, this case may not be properly before this Court, which has 
held that an appeal does not lie from a memorandum decision. Ellinwood 
v. Bennion, 73 U. 563, 276 P. 159. In any event, if the relief which 
Defendant-Appellant seeks on appeal is to have the contempt citation 
reversed, such a course is improper under the decision in Bennion, 
since that case holds the present appeal to be premature. The question 
which must thus be addressed by this Court is whether Judge Croft's 
Memorandum Decision is a "final judgment" within the meaning of 
Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
If this Court deems the memorandum decision, in which specific 
findings and conclusions are made with respect to Defendant-Appel-
lant's contempt, to be sufficient to support the contempt citation the 
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If the memor-
andum decision is here held to be insufficient, then this Court should 
remand the case for the entry of findings and conclusions on the basis 
that the memorandum decision is not a "final judgment" within the 
meaning of Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that this 
appeal is therefore premature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY D. EDMONDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, Suite #309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies of the foregoing to 
Ronald C. Barker, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 2870 South State, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, postage prepaid, this day of 
, 1977. 
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